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 要  旨 
本論文では、ノイズ付き繰り返し囚人のジレンマにて、二期相互処罰（２ＭＰ）戦略
の進化ゲーム理論的解析を行う。２ＭＰにおけるプレイヤーは、初めに協力し相手の裏
切りを観測するとそれ以降自分も裏切るが、続けて２回裏切りを観測すると元に戻り協
力する。ゲーム理論では良く知られている、代表的な戦略であるＴＦＴは、ノイズ付き
繰り返し囚人のジレンマにて均衡を構成することができない。ノイズが存在しない場合
でもＴＦＴが均衡にならない。しかし、２ＭＰはノイズ付き繰り返し囚人のジレンマに
て均衡を構成することができる。また、ＴＦＴにおけるプレイヤーはノイズ付きシグナ
ルを観測し、協力行動を取るのが困難である。ゆえに、繰り返しゲーム理論の観点では、
２ＭＰがＴＦＴより大幅に優れている。しかしながら、進化ゲーム理論の観点では、研
究されてないのが事実である。したがって、本論文では、ノイズ付き繰り返し囚人のジ
レンマにおけるレプリケータ方程式を利用し、既存の他戦略と２ＭＰのレプリケータダ
イナミクスを検討する。２ＭＰとＴＦＴが存在する母集団にＡＬＬＤを導入した場合に、
初期集団から２ＭＰとＴＦＴへの推移がほぼ同じである。ノイズが大きくなると初期集
団が完全にＡＬＬＤへ移動する。ＡＬＬＤに入れ替わってＡＬＬＣを導入するとレプリ
ケータダイナミクスが急激に変化する。具体的には、ＴＦＴが２ＭＰよりも少ない平均
利得を得る。その理由は、ノイズ付きの場合、ＴＦＴとＡＬＬＣ間の協力が難しくなる
からである。他方、２ＭＰは効率的にＡＬＬＣを利用し、より高い利得を得る。したが
って、ノイズが大きくなると母集団は初期集団から２ＭＰへ移動する傾向がある。最後
に、四つの戦略におけるレプリケータダイナミクスを調べ、２ＭＰ及びＴＦＴの優位性
について検討する。 
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Abstract
This paper analyses a strategy called two period mutual punishment (2MP) using
replicator dynamics in the repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with noisy observations. A
player using 2MP, will cooperate on the first move, if she observes a defection, she will
defect until she observes 2 consecutive defections, after which she will restore coopera-
tion. Interestingly, 2MP can form an equilibrium in the repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma.
While tit-for-tat (TFT, a well known strategy in repeated games) can not form an equi-
librium even without the interference of noise. When a player using TFT observes a
noisy signal, it is difficult for the player to restore cooperation. Thus, in a repeated
Prisoner‘s Dilemma, 2MP outperforms TFT. However, 2MP has not been investigated
in the context of evolutionary games. Therefore, this paper constructs simple replicator
equations for repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with noisy observation and examines 2MP’s
replicator dynamics in conjunction with existing strategies.When ALLD joins a popu-
lation of 2MP and TFT, in a setting with sufficiently small probability of noise, the
population shift towards 2MP is almost as same as the population shift towards TFT.
But, as noise increase, the whole population shifts toward ALLD. On the other hand,
when ALLD is replaced by ALLC, the dynamics drastically change. One change worthy
of notice is that TFT achieves much lower payoff than 2MP. This is partly because TFT
finds it difficult to cooperate with ALLC due to the interference of noise and partly
because 2MP effectively exploits ALLC‘s unconditional cooperativeness. 2MP performs
better against forgiving strategies than defecting strategies. A population of composed
of forgiving strategies shifts towards 2MP as the probability of noise increases. Finally,
this paper investigates replicator dynamics with four strategies and demonstrates when
2MP outperforms TFT.
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31 Introduction
In this paper, we analysed the replicator dynamics of Two-Period mutual punishment strategy
(2MP, Figure 2) in the repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with noise (section 2.3). A player using
2MP, will cooperate on the first move, if she observes a defection, she will defect until she
observes two consecutive defections, after which she will restore cooperation. TFT on the
other hand is a strategy that imitates the opponents move. If two TFT players interact
with each other and one defects by mistake, then the other one will retaliate, which in turn
leads to a sequence of alternating moves of cooperation and defection. Therefore, TFT players
observing noisy signals will have difficulty restoring corporation[12]. 2MP, however can restore
corporation after two defections of the opponent. Thus, 2MP is able to outperform TFT in
a repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with noise. 2MP was also found to exploit all other pure
strategy equilibria in the repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma[4]. That said, even though 2MP does
well compared to mammoth strategies like TFT, in the repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma, it has
not been extensively researched in the context of evolutionary games. Therefore, in this paper
we will investigate the replicator dynamics of 2MP in the repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with
noise. We used observation methods like perfect monitoring, nearly perfect (NP) monitoring
and conditionally independent (CI) monitoring to better understand the replicator dynamics
of 2MP
Replicator dynamics (section 2.4) in the simplest of terms is the use of a differential equa-
tion (replicator equation [5]) to analyse evolutionary game dynamics. The replicator equation
is the cornerstone of evolutionary game dynamics. It describes a frequency-dependent (pop-
ulation dependent) selection among n different strategies1 in an infinitely large population
without mutation. We used a variety of strategies such as ALLC, ALLD, GRIM, 1-MP
(pavlov), TFT, GTFT and TFTT (all of which are well known in game theory circles) in this
research.
2MP, against ALLD and TFT in the presence of noise with CI monitoring, does not
outperform either of the strategies. As the noise increases ALLD dominates both 2MP and
TFT. Replacing ALLD with GRIM had similar results. GRIM even managed to exploit
2MP much more than ALLD. Replacing ALLD with ALLC however, had the desired effect,
2MP managed to exploit other strategies effectively at lower noise levels. When noise levels
increased the populations shifted towards 2MP.
In general, the Prisoner‘s Dilemma game is conducted between two players (set of players:
N = {1, 2}) in sequential or simultaneous settings. However, in this paper we conduct the
Prisoner‘s Dilemma game in a simultaneous setting with varying degrees of visibility using
monitoring methods such as perfect monitoring, nearly perfect monitoring and conditionally
independent monitoring (section 2.3). In the repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma players simultane-
ously choose to either cooperate or defect. Thus the set of actions available to each player is
(A = {C,D}).
In the following sections, we will first describe the settings, strategies and signal distribu-
tions with (section 2) which the games are conducted. And secondly, we will illustrate the
replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT. After which we will
illustrate the replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLC and TFT/ GTFT. TFTT. Lastly, we
will demonstrate the replicator dynamics of four strategies (ALLC, ALLD, TFT, 2MP).
1In this paper the number of strategies in a population are limited to four.
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In this section we will briefly explain the commonly used terms of this research and the
framework used.
2.1 Setting
In the Prisoner‘s Dilemma there are two players and each has two possible choices, cooperating
(C) or defecting (D). If both players cooperate, they gain a payoff R (reward). If both players
defect, they gain a lower payoff P (punishment). A defector playing against a cooperator
gains the highest payoff T (temptation) and a cooperator against a defector gains the lowest
payoff S (sucker). A game is a Prisoner‘s Dilemma only if T > R > P > S.
The Prisoner‘s Dilemma game is symmetric, i.e. temptation, reward, punishment and
sucker payoff is the same for each player. In a finite Prisoner‘s Dilemma game, it is best to
defect to gain a higher payoff. Mutual cooperation becomes a viable choice only if the game
is repeated. However, in an repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma, alternating between cooperation
and would lead to a higher payoff than mutual cooperation. To avoid this the condition
R > (T + S)/2 is included [2, 6].
Table 1: General Prisoner‘s Dilemma payoff table
C D
C R,R S,T
D T,S P,P
Table 2: Prisoner‘s Dilemma payoff values assigned for this thesis
C D
C 1,1 -1,2
D 2,-1 0,0
Games can be either finitely or infinitely repeated. A remarkable feature of a finitely
repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma, is that the Nash Equilibria are non-cooperative, i.e. ’defection’
trumps ’cooperation’. Thus in a finitely repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma there is no dilemma
as has been said. To prevent this non-cooperativeness, we can infinitely repeat the game.
Infinitely repeating is the repetition of a stage game each period starting from t = 0. Each
stage game is a simultaneous game. i.e. Each player is ignorant of what the other is doing in
that period. At the end of each period the actions of the opponent is relieved to each player.
In an infinitely repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma mutual cooperation becomes a viable choice
since players would gain a higher payoff. This paper focuses on infinitely repeated Prisoner‘s
Dilemma games only. However, infinitely repeated need not mean that the game never ends.
It can be interpreted as a situation in which the game eventually ends but the players are
uncertain of when or if the game will end. To the players there is always a probability that
the game will continue to the next period [2, 6].
Players receive their payoffs period by period. When the game is infinitely repeated the
payoff of the players will add up to infinity. To avoid this problem and to ensure the finiteness
of repeated game payoffs the discounting of future payoffs is incorporated. When the discount
factor (δ) is incorporated, the payoff for the current period is greater than that of the next
period, assuming that the payoffs are the same current period and next. e.g. The payoff
for current period is $1000, but when δ = 0.9, the payoff for the next period will be only
5$900($1000 ∗ δ). The discount factor (δ; δ ∈ [0, 1]) can also be interpreted as the patience of
a player.
Noise is a non-zero probability that a player’s decision will be transmitted incorrectly or
be misperceived. i.e. In the presence of noise ’cooperate’ becomes ’defect’ and vice versa,
randomly. Regardless of a misperception, an incorrect transmission or a mistake in judgement
the result can be notably important in evolutionary game dynamics, when a player‘s payoff
depends on the other player‘s decisions. In this paper, noise is defined as a non-zero probability
that a player‘s decision will be misperceived.
2.2 Strategies
To analyse the replicator dynamics of 2MP we used several existing strategies such as ALLC,
ALLD, GRIM, TFT, GTFT and TFTT. Lets summarize these existing strategies in the liter-
ature of repeated games. Finite state automata (FSA) diagrams are used to better represent
the functionality of these strategies.
Figure 1, ALLC is an unconditionally cooperating strategy. i.e ALLC will always cooperate
(C) irrespective of the opponents signal. The opponents signal could be good (g, cooperating
is good) or bad (b, defecting is bad), ALLC will always cooperate (we have represented this in
the FSA by using an ∗, the signal could be either good or bad.). Therefore, the FSA of ALLC
only has one state R (reward). Player i will always take action ai = C in state R. ALLC is
often taken advantage of because of its forgiving nature to unconditionally cooperate.
Figure 1, ALLD is the exact opposite of ALLC and is an unconditionally defecting strategy.
i.e ALLD will always defect (D) irrespective of the opponents signal. The opponents signal
could be good (g) or bad (b), ALLC will always defect. Therefore, the FSA of ALLD only
has one state P (punishment). Player i will always take action ai = D in state P. ALLD is
the prime defector of all defecting strategies. As noise increases ALLD is most likely to have
better payoff than other strategies.
Figure 1, Grim-trigger (GT) is a well-known FSA, using which a player will first cooperate,
but as soon as she observes defection, she will defect forever. As shown in Figure 1, this FSA
has two states, i.e. R (reward) and P (punishment).Player i takes ai = C in state R and ai = D
in state P. Grim-trigger can often constitute of an equilibrium under perfect and imperfect
monitoring.[4]
Figure 1, Tit-for-tat (TFT) is another well-known FSA. TFT as the name itself suggests
will mirror the opponents move. If the opponent cooperates TFT will also cooperate. If the
opponent defects TFT too will defect. This can be a good strategy under perfect monitoring
but once noise is introduced TFT can often go into a never ending loop cycling between
cooperation and defection2. TFT‘s FSA has two states R (reward) and P (punishment). It is
well known that TFT does not have the ability to correct mistake occured from the interference
of noise.
Figure 2, Generous Tit-for-tat (GTFT) is also a well-known FSA in game theory circles and
is an extension of TFT. GTFT as the name itself suggests, is much more forgiving than TFT.
GTFT too mirrors the opponents move but when the opponent defects GTFT will cooperate
with a probability of (1/3) instead of defecting. GTFT‘s FSA has two states R (reward) and
P (punishment), see Figure 2.
Figure 2, Tit for two tats3 (TFTT) is another extension of TFT. Although the commonly
2Unitl noise pulls it out of the cycle.
3This is not the commonly known TFTT strategy.
6Figure 1: The FSAs of ALLC, ALLD, GRIM and TFT. ∗ represents that a signal could be either good
or bad. (g) and (b) denote that the signal from the opponent is good and bad respectively. State R is to
cooperate and State P is to defect.
Figure 2: The FSAs of GTFT, TFTT and 2MP. ∗ represents that a signal could be either good or bad. (g)
and (b) denote that the signal from the opponent is good and bad respectively. State R is to cooperate and
State P is to defect.
used TFTT incorporates tit or a tat as a defection, in this paper we have incorporated a
tit or a tat as a cooperation. A player using TFTT, once being defected will not return to
cooperation until the opponent cooperates twice consecutively. TFTT unlike TFT and GTFT
is a far less forgiving strategy and has three states R (reward), P1 (punishment state 1) and
P2 (punishment state 2). See Figure 2.
Figure 2, Two period mutual punishment (2MP)is an extension of 1-MP (better known
as Pavlov). A player using 2MP, will cooperate on the first move, if the player observes
a defection, she will defect until she observes 2 consecutive defections, after which she will
return to cooperation. 2MP like TFTT has three states, R (reward), P1 (punishment state
1), P2 (punishment state 2). See Figure 2.
2.3 Signal Distribution
When two players play a simultaneous game we assume that each player can observe the oppo-
nents move at the end of each period. However, we can limit or expand the observation ability
of players using various monitoring methods. There are various types of monitoring meth-
7ods such as private monitoring, public monitoring, perfect monitoring, imperfect monitoring,
nearly perfect monitoring and conditionally independent monitoring. All these monitoring
methods describe how a player would receive or transmit an observation (signal from the
opponent).
In this paper we analysed perfect monitoring (zero probability of noise), nearly perfect
monitoring (a σ probability of noise) and conditionally independent monitoring (a  probability
of noise). In the below section, we will calculate the payoffs for ALLD vs TFT using these
monitoring methods.
Perfect monitoring, monitoring is perfect if players can observe the other players‘ actions
directly. With perfect monitoring since players can directly observe each others actions there
is no chance of noise to occur. One can say that with perfect monitoring the probability of
noise is equal to 0 . Below, we have used the Markov chain to calculate the payoffs for repeated
Prisoner‘s Dilemma using ALLD vs TFT under perfect monitoring.
The existing states for ALLD and TFT are PR and PP, see Figure 1. g and b represent if
a signal from the opponent is good or bad. If the opponent has chosen state R (cooperated)
then the signal will be good. If the opponent has chosen state P (defected) then the signal
will be bad. V PRandV PP are the payoffs4 for the respective initial states PR and PP. In the
Markov chain, the transition matrix shows the probabilities of shifting from state PR to PR
and PP and vice versa. δ is the discounted payoff.
• For PR
[ g b
g PR PR
b PP PP
]
• The probability of shifting to another state
[ g b
g 0 0
b 1 0
]
• For PP
[ g b
g PR PR
b PP PP
]
• The probability of shifting to another state
[ g b
g 0 0
b 0 1
]
(
V PR
V PP
)
=
(
T
P
)
+ δ ∗
(
0 1
0 1
)(
V PR
V PP
)
• Since we have assigned values (1,−1, 2, 0) to (R, S, T, P ) respectively.(
V PR
V PP
)
=
(
2
0
)
+ δ ∗
(
0 1
0 1
)(
V PR
V PP
)
V PR =
2(1− δ)
1− δ
4For replicator dynamics we use V PR as the payoff since it consists of the starting states of ALLD (P) and
TFT (R).
8Nearly perfect (NP) monitoring, at the end of each period, each player under nearly perfect
monitoring will observe the opponent‘s action in that period with a minute margin of error
(noise). In this paper we have denoted this minute probability of noise as σ. We analysed
the replicator dynamics with four probabilities (0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15)5 under nearly perfect
monitoring, see section 3.1. Below, we have used the Markov chain to calculate the payoffs
for repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma using ALLD vs TFT under nearly perfect monitoring.
• For PR
[ g b
g PR PR
b PP PP
]
→
[ g b
g σ σ
b (1− 3σ) σ
]
• For PP
[ g b
g PR PR
b PP PP
]
→
[ g b
g σ σ
b σ (1− 3σ)
]
(
V PR
V PP
)
=
(
T
P
)
+ δ ∗
(
σ + σ (1− 3σ) + σ
σ + σ σ + (1− 3σ)
)(
V PR
V PP
)
• Since we have assigned values (1,−1, 2, 0) to (R, S, T, P ) respectively.(
V PR
V PP
)
=
(
2
0
)
+ δ ∗
(
2σ (1− 2σ)
2σ (1− 2σ)
)(
V PR
V PP
)
V PR =
2δ(2σ − 1) + 2
1− δ
Conditionally independent (CI) monitoring, at the end of each period, each player observes
a conditionally independent private signal about the opponent‘s action in that period. In this
paper we have denoted the probability of noise occurring under conditionally independent mon-
itoring as . We analysed the replicator dynamics with four probabilities (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3)6,
see section 3.1. Below, we have used the Markov chain to calculate the payoffs for repeated
Prisoner‘s Dilemma using ALLD vs TFT under conditionally independent monitoring.
• For PR
[ g b
g PR PR
b PP PP
]
→
[ g b
g (1− ) 2
b (1− )2 (1− )
]
• For PP
[ g b
g PR PR
b PP PP
]
→
[ g b
g 2 (1− )
b (1− ) (1− )2
]
(
V PR
V PP
)
=
(
T
P
)
+ δ ∗
(
(1− ) + 2 (1− )2 + (1− )
2 + (1− ) (1− )+ (1− )2
)(
V PR
V PP
)
5We will explain how these values were chosen later in this section.
6We will explain how these values were chosen later in this section.
9• Since we have assigned values (1,−1, 2, 0) to (R, S, T, P ) respectively.
(
V PR
V PP
)
=
(
2
0
)
+ δ ∗
(PR PP
PR  (1− )
PP  (1− )
)(
V PR)
V PP
)
V PR =
2δ(− 1) + 2
1− δ
Relationship between NP an CI monitoring. In the above sections different probabilities of
noise were selected for different methods. In this section we will explain how and why we used
those probabilities. Firstly, we will explain the relationship of noise between nearly perfect
monitoring and conditionally independent monitoring.
Since there is no apparent relationship between NP and CI monitoring, we needed a com-
mon ground,upon which to compare the replicator dynamics when using NP monitoring and
CI monitoring, two completely different monitoring methods. We found this common ground
by equating the probability of shifting from one state to another (e.g. from PR to PP in
ALLD vs TFT) in CI monitoring and NP monitoring. i.e For ALLD vs TFT under NP mon-
itoring the probability of shifting from PR to PP is (1− 2σ), see 2.3. For CI monitoring this
probability is (1− ). By equating these two probabilities,
1− 2σ = 1− 
σ =

2
we get the above correlation.
Next we will explain how we decided on the noise levels. (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3) for CI mon-
itoring and (0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15) NP monitoring. As explained above you can see that the
noise levels of NP monitoring is exactly half of that of CI monitoring. We used Figure 3
to determine the range of noise. For this we plotted the frequency (population) of ALLD
with respect to increasing noise. Our assumption was that with lower frequencies of ALLD,
other strategies might have a better chance at survival or to be in an equilibrium. Upon this
assumption we calculated the noise levels that would result in lower frequencies of ALLD. In
Figure 3, we see that xALLD goes to 0 between the noise levels of 0.05 to 0.3. Therefore, we
set the noise levels pertaining to CI monitoring at (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3).
2.4 Replicator Dynamics
There are two main approaches to evolutionary game theory. The first approach incorporates
the concept of and evolutionary stable strategy as the principal form of analysis, this is based
on the works of Maynard Smith [8] and Price. The second approach which we will be using in
this paper uses an explicit model of the process by which the frequency7 of strategies evolve in
the population and studies properties of the evolutionary game dynamics within that model
[9]. How do the frequencies of strategies evolve? How do they grow and diminish? There
7The size of a population using a certain strategy.
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Figure 3: Population change of xALLD with noise under CI Monitoring
are many approaches to modelling this process. We shall mostly assume that the state of the
population evolves according to the replicator equation (1). The replicator equation holds if
the growth rate of a strategy‘s frequency corresponds to the strategy‘s payoff, or more precisely
to the difference between its payoff and the average payoff in the population [19]. We will
explain this differential equation below.
Lets consider the interaction among n strategies. Let the payoff for strategy i when in-
teracting with strategy j be given by aij. The nxn-matrix A = [aij] is called the ”payoff
matrix”. Let xi denote the frequency (the size of a population using strategy i) of strategy i.
The expected payoff of strategy i is given by fi =
∑n
j=1 xjaij. The average payoff is given by
φ =
∑n
i=1 xifi. Equating payoff with fitness, we obtain the replicator equation (1). [12]
x˙i = xi[fj(
−→x )− φ(−→x )] (1)
Lets put the equation into use. Lets consider the replicator dynamics between two strate-
gies A and B. We assume that players only differ by strategy and xA + xB = 1 at all times,
if xA = x then xB = 1 − x. Let xA and xB denote the frequency of A and B respectively.
Then, −→x = (xA, xB) defines the composition of the population. Let fA(−→x ) denote the payoff
of when using strategy A and fB(
−→x ) denote the payoff of B. Let the payoff matrix for A and
B be as shown below. [ A B
A a b
B c d
]
Therefore, fA(
−→x ) = axA + bxB and fB(−→x ) = cxA + dxB. The average payoff is given by
φ = xAfA(
−→x ) + xBfB(−→x ). Using the above information we can write the the replicator
equations as (2), (3).
x˙A = xA[fA(
−→x )− φ] (2)
x˙B = xB[fB(
−→x )− φ] (3)
Since xB = 1−xA and φ = xAfA(−→x ) +xBfB(−→x ) we can combine (2) and (3) as shown below.
x˙A = xA(1− xA)[fA(−→x )− fB(−→x )]
11
when xA = x, (2) and (3) can be written as
x˙ = x(1− x)[fA(x)− fB(x)] (4)
When x˙ = 0 the solution or solutions denote fixed points where populations will not evolve
anymore. Using the payoff values of A vs B (4) can be written as below.
x˙ = x(1− x)[(a− b− c+ d)x+ b− d] (5)
For x˙ = 0, apart from the trivial fixed points x = 0 and x = 1, the replicator equation can
have a third fixed point x∗ for a > c and d > b or for a < c and d < b,
x∗ =
d− b
a− b− c+ d (6)
we can distinguish four generic cases [3, 12], see Figure 4.
Figure 4: The replicator dynamics of evolutionary 2x2 games. The arrows indicate the direction of selection,
green circles are stable fixed points and red circles are unstable fixed points. In the neutral case, the entire
line consists of stable fixed points.
(a) Dominance, A dominates B, or if the diagram (a) was the otherway around B dominates
A. In this case if a > c and b > d A dominates B. If a < c and b < d, B dominates A. In the
first case, the fixed point at x = 1 is stable and the fixed point at x = 0 is unstable and vice
versa in the latter case.
(b) Coexistence, A and B coexist. This is the case if a < c and b > d. The population
becomes a stable mixture of A and B.
(c) Bi-stability, A and B are bistable. This is the case if a > c and b < d. If you were
to play this game with another player, you should try to play the same choice as the other
player. A is the best response for A and vice versa. For the replicator dynamics within a
population, the outcome depends on the initial condition. There is an unstable equilibrium
between x = 0andx = 1 given by x∗ = (d− b)/(a− b− c+ d). If the initial condition, x(0), is
less than x∗, then the whole population will shift to B. If x(0) > x∗, then the whole population
will shift to A.
(d) Neutrality, A and B are neutral. This is the case if a = c and b = d. The replicator
dynamics show stable fixed points for all values of x. If you were to play this game with
another player, then no matter what you chose you would have exactly the same payoff as
your opponent. In other words the population will not evolve. Any composition of A and B
is in an stable equilibrium.
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3 2MP against ALLD and TFT and the variants
In this section we will analyse the replicator dynamics of ALLD vs TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT vs
2MP with perfect monitoring and CI monitoring. Our objective is to analyse the replicator
dynamics of 2MP with an unconditionally defecting strategy (ALLD) and several conditionally
cooperating strategies (TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT, Figure 1, 2). GTFT compared to TFT is a
slightly more forgiving strategy. GTFT cooperates with a probability of 0.333 even when the
opponent player defects (Figure 2). TFTT (Tit For two Tats) as the name itself suggests, is a
far less forgiving strategy than TFT. TFTT, after being defected by the other player will not
cooperate again unless the other player cooperates twice in a row (Figure 2).
The replicator dynamics are illustrated using a ternary graph. Each vertex of the graph
is a represents a strategy in a homogeneous state and has a population of 1. Furthermore,
every point in the ternary graph defines a population. For ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP it is
denoted by (xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ). e.g. (1, 0, 0) is the vertex of the ternary graph where the
population consists only of ALLD. Whereas (xALLD = 1), (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) denotes a point
where each strategy is in same frequencies. And each axis of the ternary graph represents the
replicator dynamics of two strategies. i.e. ALLD vs TFT, ALLD vs 2MP, TFT vs 2MP. A
green dot represents a stable equilibrium point while a red dot denotes an unstable equilibrium.
When every possible frequency of two strategies are in stable equilibria it is shown by a green
(Neutrality see section 2.3). Here, a stable equilibrium is a point at which small perturbations
from the population will still result in the population converging on the stable equilibrium
point. Accordingly, an unstable equilibrium is a point at which a small perturbation from the
population will result in a deviation from the unstable equilibrium point. The blue arrows
represent vectors corresponding to the rate of population change. The direction of the arrow
can simply be interpreted as the tendency of a given population to shift towards a certain
frequency (an arrow pointing in the direction of a certain strategy (vertex) implies that the
frequency of that strategy is on the increase).
Instead of two specific players repeating a game infinitely, we consider a population of
players, each with their own strategy. Each period, two players meet at random and play
the game, using their respective strategies. After which the players are given their respective
payoffs according to their strategies. And the population will evolve their strategies depending
on these payoffs i.e. players will change their strategies into much more advantageous strategies
used by other players in the population. All of the players in the population are considered
to be identical, that is players differ only by the strategy they use.
Below are the replicator equations for ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP. x, y, z are the frequencies of
ALLD, TFT and 2MP respectively.Since the size of the population is set to 1, z = (1−x− y).
fALLD, fTFT , f2MP are the payoffs when using the strategies ALLD, TFT and 2MP respectively.
V ALLDvsTFT is the payoff of ALLD vs TFT and and so on. We can formulate the replicator
equations for GTFT and TFTT by interchanging the values corresponding to TFT with GTFT
or TFTT.
˙xALLD = x[y(f2MP − fTFT ) + (x− 1)(f2MP − fALLD)]
˙yTFT = y[(y − 1)(f2MP − fTFT ) + x(f2MP − fALLD)]
˙z2MP = z[y(f2MP − fTFT ) + x(f2MP − fALLD)]
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The payoffs for ALLD, TFT and 2MP are as follows.
fALLD = xV
ALLDvsALLD + yV ALLDvsTFT + zV ALLDvs2−MP
fTFT = xV
TFTvsALLD + yV TFTvsTFT + zV TFTvs2−MP
f2MP = xV
2MPvsALLD + yV 2MPvsTFT + zV 2MPvs2−MP
3.1 Base Case
In this section we will analyse the replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFT with
perfect monitoring, conditionally independent monitoring and nearly perfect monitoring.
Perfect Monitoring
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0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
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0.4
0.6
0.8
TFT (0, 1, 0) 2MP (0, 0, 1)
ALLD(1, 0, 0)
ALLDvs2−MPALLDvsTFT
TFTvs2−MP
ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP with Perfect Monitoring
Figure 5: The replicator dynamics of the infinitely repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with perfect monitoring
for 2MP against ALLD and TFT. Red mark denotes unstable equilibria while green denotes stable equilibria.
With perfect monitoring TFT and 2MP are able to easily dominate ALLD. However, TFT fares much better
than 2MP against ALLD individually.
Table 3: Payoffs for Perfect Monitoring
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.2 0.738
TFT -0.1 1 1
2MP -0.369 1 1
Here, we will analyse the replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFT with perfect
monitoring, perfect monitoring implies that the probability of noise is zero.
Figure 5 shows the replicator dynamics of the infinitely repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with
perfect monitoring for 2MP against ALLD and TFT. There are three equilibrium points, out
of which two are unstable equilibria, these are denoted by the red dots. And there are stable
equilibria existing for every possible population configuration of TFT vs 2MP, this is denoted
by the green straight line. Furthermore, each vertex of the ternary graph is a fixed point in a
stable equilibrium represented by a green dot. A vertex is a homogeneous state of a strategy
with the population of 1.
The two unstable equilibria exist on the axes of the graph, meaning that these equilibria
occur only when there are two strategies. In Figure 5 these axes are ALLD vs TFT and
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ALLD vs 2MP. The unstable equilibria for ALLD vs TFT and ALLD vs 2MP are as follows,
(0.889, 0.111, 0) and (0.415, 0, 0.585) respectively. For ALLD vs TFT, a tiny popu-
lation of 0.111 of TFT is able to hold off ALLD while 2MP requires a larger population of
0.585. Therefore, with perfect monitoring TFT is the better strategy against unconditionally
defecting strategies like ALLD not 2MP. Therefore, the population shift towards TFT is of a
higher density than that of 2MP. However, as one would expect, a population of ALLD, TFT
and 2MP with perfect monitoring will shift towards TFT and 2MP, but the higher tendency
is towards TFT (see Figure 5).
TFT and 2MP with perfect monitoring will keep on cooperating indefinitely and thus each
possible configuration of TFT and 2MP is in an equilibrium. Because, the players will not be
able to achieve a higher payoff even if they deviated from TFT and 2MP (see section 2.3).
We can see in Table 3, the highest average payoff for ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP with perfect
monitoring is 1, which is obtained by TFT vs TFT, TFT vs 2MP, 2MP vs 2MP, 2MP vs
TFT. This is because these strategies will cooperate on their first move and will not stray
from reciprocating unless a player defects. Therefore, when the probability of noise is zero
(perfect monitoring) these strategies will keep on cooperating.
In Figure 5), TFT and 2MP are able to exploit8 ALLD when there is no noise. But this
dramatically changes when noise is introduced (section 3.1, 3.1).
Conditionally Independent Monitoring
In this section we will analyse the replicator dynamics of ALLD, TFT and 2MP with
CI monitoring. The probability of noise is set to  = (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3). Figure 6 shows the
replicator dynamics of the infinitely repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with CI monitoring for 2MP
against ALLD and TFT.
Firstly, we will consider  = 0.05, there are seven equilibrium points, out of which four are
unstable equilibria and three are stable equilibria existing at each vertex of the ternary graph.
Out of the four unstable equilibria three are on axes of the ternary graph and therefore exists
for two strategies only. They are (0.765, 0.235, 0) for ALLD vs TFT, (0.195, 0, 0.805)
for ALLD vs 2MP and (0, 0.752, 0.248) for TFT vs 2MP. Unlike perfect monitoring, CI
monitoring set at  = 0.05 brings forth an unstable equilibrium point consisting of all three
FSA‘s. This equilibrium point is at (0.321, 0.173, 0.506).
Secondly, we will consider  = 0.1, here we can see six equilibrium points, three of which are
unstable equilibria and three being the vertices are stable equilibria consisting of a single strat-
egy in a homogeneous state. Two of the above said unstable equilibria denoted by the red dots
are on the axes of the graph pertaining to ALLD vs TFT and TFT vs 2MP. And the remaining
unstable equilibrium consists of all three FSA‘s and exists at (0.219, 0.386, 0.395)
When comparing  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 under CI monitoring the first difference we notice is
that 2MP is wholly dominated by ALLD. TFT vs 2MP on the other hand remains almost un-
changed at (0, 0.750, 0.250), compared to (0, 0.752, 0.248) when  = 0.05. For ALLD
vs TFT, TFT weakens a bit and the new unstable equilibrium point is at (0.611, 0.389, 0)
compared to (0.765, 0.235, 0) for  = 0.05.
Thirdly, we will consider  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 (Figure 7), here as was expected ALLD
exploits both TFT and 2MP. When  = 0.2, TFT is barely able to survive and when noise
is increased to  = 0.3, TFT is wholly dominated by ALLD and 2MP. Furthermore, 2MP
is also dominated by ALLD. Therefore, we can safely conclude that for 2MP against ALLD
and TFT when the noise increases under CI monitoring, ALLD becomes the best choice for
8For a population of TFT less than 0.111 and a population of 2MP less than 0.585, ALLD is still able to
fend off both TFT and 2MP.
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Figure 6: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFT with conditionally independent monitor-
ing. The probability of noise is  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 respectively. 2MP is able to dominate TFT but is unable
to fend off ALLD.
Table 4: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.290 0.733
TFT -0.145 0.763 0.663
2MP -0.366 0.711 0.821
Table 5: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.1
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.380 0.727
TFT -0.190 0.679 0.540
2MP -0.363 0.631 0.683
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Figure 7: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFT with conditionally independent mon-
itoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 respectively. As expected both TFT and 2MP are
exploited by ALLD. For  = 0.2, 2MP shows a little bit of restraint but is completely defeated when  = 0.3.
Table 6: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.2
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.560 0.716
TFT -0.280 0.609 0.402
2MP -0.358 0.597 0.506
Table 7: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.3
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.740 0.706
TFT -0.370 0.578 0.299
2MP -0.353 0.626 0.417
players. By analysing Figure 6 and Figure 7 we can conclude that each strategy is dominated
by another when the probability of noise is small. i.e when  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 TFT>ALLD,
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ALLD>2MP and 2MP>TFT. Therefore for at each instance of noise under  = 0.2 an unstable
equilibrium exists.
Nearly Perfect Monitoring
Figure 8 illustrates the replicator dynamics of ALLD, TFT and 2MP with NP monitoring.
The probabilities of noise is set to σ = 0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15.
For σ = 0.025, we can see seven equilibrium points, out of which four are unstable equilibria
and three are stable equilibria existing at each vertex of the ternary graph. Out of the four
unstable equilibria three are on axes of the ternary graph and therefore exists for two strategies
only. They are (0.765, 0.235, 0) for ALLD vs TFT, (0.265, 0, 0.735) for ALLD vs 2MP
and (0, 0.834, 0.166) for TFT vs 2MP. NP monitoring like CI monitoring set at  = 0.05
brings forth an unstable equilibrium point consisting of all three FSA‘s. This equilibrium
point is at (0.354, 0.143, 0.503).
For σ = 0.05, there are seven equilibrium points, three of which are unstable equilibria and
three being the vertices are stable equilibria consisting of a single strategy in a homogeneous
state. Three of the above said unstable equilibria denoted by the red dots, are on the axes
of the graph pertaining to ALLD vs 2MP, ALLD vs TFT and TFT vs 2MP. And the third
unstable equilibrium consists of all three FSA‘s and exists at (0.282, 0.367, 0.351)
When comparing σ = 0.025 and σ = 0.05 under NP monitoring we notice that the strate-
gies are much more balanced when σ = 0.05. We can deduce this frequencies of all three strate-
gies at σ = 0.025 are approximately in the same proportions (0.282, 0.367, 0.351). TFT
vs 2MP once again like with CI monitoring remains almost unchanged at (0, 0.824, 0.176),
compared to (0, 0.834, 0.166) of σ = 0.025. For ALLD vs TFT, TFT weakens a bit and the
new unstable equilibrium point is at (0.611, 0.389, 0) compared to, (0.765, 0.235, 0)
of σ = 0.025. 2MP also has become a bit more resilient to ALLD when compared to CI
monitoring (Figure 6).
Next, we will consider σ = 0.2 and σ = 0.3 (Figure 9), once again ALLD exploits both
TFT and 2MP. When σ = 0.1 TFT is barely able to survive, and when noise is increased
to σ = 0.15 TFT is wholly dominated by 2MP and ALLD. However a large population of
TFT can still result in an unstable equilibrium consisting of all three strategies. Furthermore,
2MP is dominated by ALLD. Therefore, we can safely conclude that for 2MP against ALLD
and TFT when the noise increases under NP monitoring, ALLD becomes the best choice for
players.
With Figure 8 and Figure 9, we can conclude that each strategy is dominated by another
when the probability of noise is small. i.e when σ = 0.025 and σ = 0.05 TFT>ALLD,
ALLD>2MP and 2MP>TFT. Therefore for at each instance of noise smaller than σ = 0.1 we
are able to observe an unstable equilibrium.
Comparison of 2MP against ALLD and TFT with CI and NP Monitoring
In this section, we will compare CI monitoring and NP monitoring.The probability of noise
set to  = 0.05 and σ = 0.025.  denotes the probability of noise for CI monitoring and σ
denotes the probability of noise for NP monitoring (section 2.3).
Although, 2MP has become a bit more resilient towards ALLD9, remarkably, NP monitor-
ing does not show a significant difference in the frequencies when compared with CI monitoring.
Each monitoring method has seven equilibria, four of which are unstable and the remaining
three equilibria are stable being the fixed points on the vertices of the graph. In both NP
and CI monitoring methods, out of the four unstable equilibria one equilibrium consists of
9The equilibrium points for ALLD vs TFT with CI and NP monitoring are (0.765, 0.235, 0) and
(0.765, 0.235, 0) respectively.
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Figure 8: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFT with nearly perfect monitoring. The
probability of noise is σ = 0.025 and σ = 0.05 respectively. 2MP is able to exploit TFT but is unable to fend
off ALLD.
Table 8: Payoffs for NP monitoring σ=0.025
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.290 0.733
TFT -0.145 0.763 0.700
2MP -0.366 0.731 0.865
Table 9: Payoffs for NP monitoring σ=0.05
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.380 0.727
TFT -0.190 0.679 0.567
2MP -0.364 0.640 0.747
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Figure 9: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFT with nearly perfect monitoring. The
probability of noise is σ = 0.1 and σ = 0.15 respectively. ALLD exploits both TFT and 2MP.
Table 10: Payoffs for NP monitoring σ=0.1
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.560 0.716
TFT -0.280 0.609 0.414
2MP -0.358 0.598 0.565
Table 11: Payoffs for NP monitoring σ=0.15
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.740 0.706
TFT -0.370 0.578 0.305
2MP -0.353 0.625 0.448
all three FSA‘s and the remaining three equilibria exist only for two strategies. i.e ALLD vs
TFT, ALLD vs 2MP and TFT vs 2MP.
Table 12 shows the unstable equilibrium points in the replicator dynamics of ALLD vs TFT
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vs 2MP with conditionally independent monitoring and nearly perfect monitoring. According
to Table 12, 2MP with NP monitoring is a bit more robust than with CI monitoring. However,
in both cases ALLD becomes the better choice as noise increases.
Since NP monitoring and CI monitoring yielded almost identical results we focused only
on perfect monitoring and CI monitoring from this point onwards.
Table 12: Unstable Equilibrium Points for ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP with CI and NP Monitoring
CI Monitoring NP Monitoring
ALLD vs TFT (0.765, 0.235, 0) (0.765, 0.235, 0)
ALLD vs 2MP (0.195, 0, 0.805) (0.265, 0, 0.735)
TFT vs 2MP (0, 0.752, 0.248) (0, 0.834, 0.166)
ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP (0.321, 0.173, 0.506) (0.354, 0.143, 0.503)
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Figure 10: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFT with nearly perfect monitoring and
conditionally independnet monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.05 and σ = 0.025 respectively. The
replicator dynamics in the two instances are almost identical to one another.
Table 13: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.290 0.733
TFT -0.145 0.763 0.700
2MP -0.366 0.731 0.865
Table 14: Payoffs for NP Monitoring σ=0.025
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.290 0.733
TFT -0.145 0.763 0.663
2MP -0.366 0.711 0.821
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3.2 GTFT
In this section, we will analyse the replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and GTFT with
perfect monitoring and CI monitoring. Our objective is to analyse the replicator dynamics
of 2MP with an unconditionally defecting strategy (ALLD) and a conditionally cooperating
strategies (GTFT) (Figure 1).
Perfect Monitoring
Here, we will analyse the replicator dynamics of ALLD vs GTFT vs 2MP with perfect
monitoring, perfect monitoring implies that the probability of noise is zero.
Figure 11 shows the replicator dynamics of the infinitely repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma
with perfect monitoring for 2MP against ALLD and GTFT. In Figure 11, there are three
equilibrium points, out of which two are unstable equilibria, these are denoted by the red
dots, and we can also see stable equilibria existing for every possible population configuration
of GTFT vs 2MP, this is denoted by the green straight line. GTFT vs 2MP is neutral i.e.
neither 2MP nor GTFT can get a better payoff by changing its strategy. Furthermore, each
vertex of the ternary graph is an stable equilibrium represented by a green dot. A vertex is a
homogeneous state of a strategy with the population equal to 1. The two unstable equilibria
exist on the axes of the graph, meaning that these equilibria occur only when there are two
strategies. These axes are ALLD vs GTFT and ALLD vs 2MP.
The unstable equilibria for ALLD vs GTFT and ALLD vs 2MP are as follows, (0.555, 0.445, 0)
and (0.415, 0, 0.585) respectively. GTFT when defected by the other player will try to
cooperate once in three moves. ALLD is able to succesfully exploit this nature. GTFT vs
2MP with perfect monitoring will keep on cooperating indefinitely and thus each possible
configuration of GTFT and 2MP are in equilibria. This is because, the players will not be
able to get a higher payoff even if they deviated from GTFT and 2MP.
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
GTFT (0, 1, 0) 2MP (0, 0, 1)
ALLD(1, 0, 0)
ALLDvs2−MPALLDvsGTFT
GTFTvs2−MP
ALLD vs GTFT vs 2MP Perfect Monitoring
Figure 11: The replicator dynamics of the infinitely repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with perfect monitoring for
ALLD vs GTFT vs 2MP with perfect monitoring. GTFT becasuse of its forgiving nature, is taken advantage
of by ALLD.
Table 15: Payoffs for Perfect monitoring
ALLD GTFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.615 0.738
GTFT -0.308 1 1
2MP -0.369 1 1
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The highest average payoff for ALLD vs GTFT vs 2MP with perfect monitoring is 1,
which is obtained by GTFT vs GTFT, GTFT vs 2MP, 2MP vs 2MP and 2MP vs GTFT.
This is because, these strategies will cooperate on their first move and will not stray from
reciprocating unless a player defects. Therefore, when the probability of noise is zero (perfect
monitoring) these strategies will keep on cooperating. With perfect monitoring we did not
find an equilibrium point containing of all three FSA‘s. In the next section we will analyse
these strategies with CI monitoring.
Conditionally Independent Monitoring
In this section we will analyse the replicator dynamics of ALLD vs GTFT vs 2MP with CI
monitoring. The probability of noise is set to  = (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3). GTFT is a slightly more
forgiving strategy than TFT and TFTT is a far less forgiving strategy than TFT (Figure 1).
For 2MP against ALLD and TFT under CI monitoring, see section 3.1. Figure 12 and 13 shows
the replicator dynamics of the infinitely repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with CI monitoring for
2MP against ALLD and GTFT with varying probabilities of noise.
Firstly, we will consider  = 0.05, we can see five equilibrium points, out of which two are
unstable equilibria and three are stable equilibria existing at each vertex of the ternary graph.
The two unstable equilibria are on the axes of the ternary graph and therefore exists for two
strategies only. They are (0.288, 0.712, 0) for ALLD vs GTFT, (0.195, 0, 0.805) for
ALLD vs 2MP and for GTFT vs 2MP, 2MP dominates GTFT.
Secondly, we will consider  = 0.1, here we can see only four equilibrium points, three of
which are stable equilibria at the vertices of the graph and consisting of a single strategy in
a homogeneous state. The remaining equilibrium is an unstable equilibrium denoted by the
red dot and is on the axis of the graph pertaining to ALLD vs GTFT. Although an unstable
eqilibrium exists ALLD has more or less dominated the whole population, except for large
populations of GTFT (Figure 12).
When comparing  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 under CI monitoring we notice that GTFT is
wholly dominated by ALLD and 2MP except for when the 2MP population is 0 and the GTFT
populations is larger than 0.712. In Figure 12, without the presence of 2MP, GTFT is able to
hold off ALLD. When the tiniest fraction of 2MP is introduced GTFT is completely weakened.
For larger populations of GTFT (>0.712) and smaller populations of ALLD (<0.195) the
population shifts towrds 2MP.
Thirdly, we will consider  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 (Figure 13), here as was seen in ALLD vs TFT
vs 2MP (Figure 6), ALLD exploits both GTFT and 2MP. The presence of GTFT compared
to TFT has made ALLD much more stronger. Both GTFT and 2MP are wholly dominated
by ALLD. Therefore, we can conclude that for 2MP against ALLD and TFT when the noise
increases under CI monitoring, ALLD becomes the best choice for players.
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Figure 12: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and GTFT with conditionally independent
monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 respectively. 2MP is able to dominate GTFT but
is in return exploited by ALLD.
Table 16: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLD GTFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.669 0.733
GTFT -0.335 0.804 0.654
2MP -0.366 1.429 0.821
Table 17: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.1
ALLD GTFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.724 0.727
GTFT -0.362 0.742 0.491
2MP -0.363 1.485 0.683
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Figure 13: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and GTFT with conditionally independent
monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 respectively. Both TFT and 2MP are exploited by
ALLD.
Table 18: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.2
ALLD GTFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.839 0.716
GTFT -0.419 0.682 0.317
2MP -0.358 1.327 0.505
Table 19: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.3
ALLD GTFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.959 0.706
GTFT -0.479 0.649 0.211
2MP -0.353 1.176 0.417
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3.3 TFTT
In this section, we will analyse the replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and GTFT with
perfect monitoring and CI monitoring. Our objective is to analyse the replicator dynamics
of 2MP with an unconditionally defecting strategy (ALLD) and a conditionally cooperating
strategies (TFTT) (Figure 2).
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Figure 14: The replicator dynamics of the infinitely repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with perfect monitoring
for ALLD vs TFTT vs 2MP with perfect monitoring. With perfect monitoring TFTT and 2MP are able to
fend off ALLD relatively easily with the exception of populations less than 0.111 for TFTT and populations
less than 0.585 for 2MP.
Table 20: Payoffs for Perfect Monitoring
ALLD TFTT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.200 0.738
TFTT -0.100 1 1
2MP -0.369 1 1
Here, we will analyse the replicator dynamics of ALLD vs TFTT vs 2MP with perfect
monitoring, perfect monitoring implies that the probability of noise is zero.
Figure 2 shows the replicator dynamics of the infinitely repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with
perfect monitoring for 2MP against ALLD, TFTT. There are three equilibrium points, out
of which two are unstable equilibria, these are denoted by the red dots, and we can also see
stable equilibria existing for every possible population configuration of TFTT vs 2MP, this is
denoted by the green straight line. TFTT vs 2MP is neutral i.e. neither 2MP nor TFTT can
get a better payoff by changing its strategy. Furthermore, each vertex of the ternary graph
is an stable equilibrium represented by a green dot. A vertex is a homogeneous state of a
strategy with the population equal to 1. The two unstable equilibria exist on the axes of the
graph, meaning that these equilibria occur only when there are two strategies. In Figure 2,
these axes are ALLD vs TFTT and ALLD vs 2MP.
The unstable equilibria for ALLD vs TFTT and ALLD vs 2MP are, (0.889, 0.111, 0)
and (0.415, 0, 0.585) respectively. For ALLD vs TFTT, a tiny population of TFTT (0.111
is able to hold off ALLD, while 2MP requires a population of 0.585. Therefore, with perfect
monitoring TFTT is much better than 2MP when it comes to fending off ALLD.
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ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP (section 3.1) and ALLD vs TFTT vs 2MP have identical replicator
dynamics with perfect monitoring. This can be better understood by comparing the FSA
diagrams of TFT and TFTT (Figure 1, 2). TFT and TFTT against ALLD, once defected will
not return reciprocation until the opponent cooperates, but in the case of ALLD with perfect
monitoring there is no chance that the signal from ALLD will be misperceived as cooperation,
hence we can expect the same replicator dynamics for ALLD vs TFT and ALLD vs TFTT.
TFTT vs 2MP with perfect monitoring will keep on cooperating indefinitely and thus each
possible configuration of TFTT and 2MP are in equilibria. This is because, the players will
not be able to get a higher payoff even if they deviated from TFTT and 2MP. In Figure 2),
TFTT and 2MP are able to exploit10 ALLD with perfect monitoring.
The highest average payoff for ALLD vs TFTT vs 2MP with perfect monitoring is 1,
which is obtained by TFTT vs TFTT, TFTT vs 2MP, 2MP vs 2MP and 2MP vs TFTT.
This is because, these strategies will cooperate on their first move and will not stray from
reciprocating unless a player defects. Therefore, when the probability of noise is zero (perfect
monitoring) these strategies will keep on cooperating. With perfect monitoring we did not
find an equilibrium point containing of all three FSA‘s. In the next section we will analyse
these strategies with CI monitoring.
Conditionally Independent Monitoring
Figure 15 and 16 illustrates the replicator dynamics of ALLD, TFTT and 2MP with CI
monitoring. The probability of noise is set to  = (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3).
For  = 0.05, we can see six equilibrium points, out of which three are unstable equilibria
and three are stable equilibria existing at each vertex of the ternary graph. The three unstable
equilibria are on axes of the ternary graph and therefore exists for two strategies only. They
are (0.765, 0.235, 0) for ALLD vs TFTT, (0.195, 0, 0.805) for ALLD vs 2MP and
(0, 0.332, 0.668) for TFTT vs 2MP. For  = 0.05, TFTT is able exploit both ALLD and
2MP, which GTFT was not able to do.
For  = 0.1, here too we can see six equilibrium points, three of which are stable equilibria
at the vertices of the graph and consisting of a single strategy in a homogeneous state. Out
of the remaining equilibria all are unstable and two are denoted by the red dots on the axes
of the graph pertaining to ALLD vs TFTT and TFTT vs 2MP. They are (0.134, 0.867, 0)
for ALLD vs TFTT and (0, 0.109, 0.891) for TFTT vs 2MP. The remaining equilibrium is
an unstable equilibrium consisiting of all three FSA‘s and exists at (0.033, 0.390, 0.577).
When comparing  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 under CI monitoring we notice that TFTT is able
to hold its own against 2MP for a certain population 11. But this population significantly
changes12 when the noise increases from 0.05 to 0.01, see Figure 15. 2MP has considerably
weakened against TFTT when the noise increased. We can see that with the introduction of
TFTT, a far less forgiving strategy than both TFT and GTFT, 2MP is weakened considerably.
For  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 (Figure 16), the major difference is that TFTT is able to dominate
2MP rather than the other way around (TFT and GTFT both were dominated by 2MP).
10For a population of TFTT less than 0.111 and a population of 2MP less than 0.585, ALLD is still able
to fend off TFTT and 2MP.
11ALLD populations <0.765 and 2MP populations <0.668.
12ALLD populations <0.134 and 2MP populations <0.891.
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Figure 15: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFTT with conditionally independent
monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 respectively. For  = 0.05 TFTT is able to exploit
2MP and ALLD but when  = 0.1 ALLD exploits both TFTT and 2MP.
Table 21: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLD TFTT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.213 0.733
TFTT -0.107 0.560 0.777
2MP -0.366 0.472 0.821
Table 22: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.1
ALLD TFTT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.234 0.727
TFTT -0.117 0.414 0.672
2MP -0.363 0.331 0.683
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Figure 16: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFTT with conditionally
independent monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 respectively. Both
TFTT and 2MP are exploited by ALLD. When xALLD = 0 TFTT dominates 2MP.
Table 23: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.2
ALLD TFTT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.301 0.716
TFTT -0.150 0.321 0.557
2MP -0.358 0.262 0.505
Table 24: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.3
ALLD TFTT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.400 0.706
TFTT -0.200 0.312 0.481
2MP -0.353 0.263 0.417
25
Comparison of ALLD vs TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT vs 2MP with CI Monitoring
In this section we will compare the replicator dynamics of ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP, ALLD
vs GTFT vs 2MP and ALLD vs TFTT vs 2MP with CI monitoring. The probability of noise
is set to  = 0.05. For ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP see section 3.1. For ALLD vs GTFT vs 2MP
see section 3.2. For ALLD vs TFTT vs 2MP see section 3.3.
GTFT compared to TFT is a slightly more forgiving strategy. We say GTFT is slightly
more forgiving because GTFT cooperates with a probability of 0.333 even when the opponent
player defects, Figure 2. TFTT (Tit For two Tats) as the name itself suggests, is a far less
forgiving strategy than TFT. TFTT, after being defected by the other player will not cooperate
again unless the other player cooperates twice in a row (Figure 2).
When comparing the replicator dynamics for the three instances, ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP
and ALLD vs TFTT vs 2MP have similar replicator dynamics with the one exception of
TFTT exploiting 2MP. TFT however, has brought more balance to the population (unstable
equilibrium consisting of all three strategies), whereas GTFT has shifted13 the population
towards either ALLD or 2MP, and TFTT has shifted the population towards itself. GTFT
because of its forgiving nature is completely taken advantage of by 2MP. But is able to fend
off ALLD when the frequency of 2MP is 0.
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Table 25: Payoffs for CI Monitoring
ALLD TFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.290 0.733
TFT -0.145 0.763 0.663
2MP -0.366 0.711 0.821
13For ALLD vs GTFT vs 2MP the population shift towards 2MP and ALLD seems almost half and half.
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Figure 17: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT with conditionally
independent monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.05. While TFT and GTFT are both exploited
by 2MP, TFTT is able to stand against 2MP. Out of TFT, GTFT and TFTT the weakest strategy in these
settings is GTFT.
Table 26: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLD GTFT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.669 0.733
GTFT -0.335 0.804 0.654
2MP -0.366 1.429 0.821
Table 27: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLD TFTT 2MP
ALLD 0 0.213 0.733
TFTT -0.107 0.560 0.777
2MP -0.366 0.472 0.821
4 2MP against Grim-Trigger and TFT
Here, we will investigate the replicator dynamics of Grim-Trigger (GRIM) vs TFT vs 2MP
with CI monitoring. We will not consider perfect monitoring since all of these strategies
cooperate on their first move and will not defect. Our objective is to analyse the replicator
dynamics of 2MP with two conditionally cooperating strategies (GRIM and TFT, see 2.2).
GRIM (see Figure 2) is a strategy which cooperates on the first move but if the other player
defects even once it will continuously defect till the game ends. GRIM compared to ALLD
can cooperate, which ALLD is cannot14.
A ternary graph is used, with each vertex being the homogeneous state of each of the
three strategies with a population of 1. All individuals in the population are considered to
be identical, players differ only by their strategy. Every point in the ternary graph defines a
population and is denoted by (xGRIM , yTFT , z2MP ). Where, (1, 0, 0) is the vertex of the ternary
graph where the population consists only of GRIM (xGRIM = 1), (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) denotes a point
where each strategy has the same frequency. Each axis of the ternary graph represents the
replicator dynamics of two strategies. GRIM vs TFT, GRIM vs 2MP, TFT vs 2MP. A green
mark represents a stable equilibrium point while a red mark denotes an unstable equilibrium.
The blue arrows represent a vector corresponding to rate of population change. The direction
of the arrow can simply be interpreted as the tendency of a given population to shift towards
14ALLD unconditionally defects, but GRIM will unconditionally defect only if the other player defects first.
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a certain population (an arrow pointing in the direction of a certain strategy (vertex) implies
that the frequency of that strategy is on the increase).
Below are the replicator equations for GRIM vs TFT vs 2MP. x, y, z are the frequencies
of GRIM, TFT and 2MP respectively.Since the size of the population is set to 1, z = (1 −
x − y). fGRIM , fTFT , f2MP are the payoffs when using the strategies GRIM, TFT and 2MP
respectively. V GRIMvsTFT is the payoff of GRIM vs TFT and and so on.
˙xGRIM = x[y(f2MP − fTFT ) + (x− 1)(f2MP − fGRIM)]
˙yTFT = y[(y − 1)(f2MP − fTFT ) + x(f2MP − fGRIM)]
˙z2MP = z[y(f2MP − fTFT ) + x(f2MP − fGRIM)]
The payoffs for ALLD, GTFT and 2MP are as follows.
fGRIM = xV
GRIMvsGRIM + yV GRIMvsTFT + zV GRIMvs2−MP
fTFT = xV
TFTvsGRIM + yV TFTvsTFT + zV TFTvs2−MP
f2MP = xV
2MPvsGRIM + yV 2MPvsTFT + zV 2MPvs2−MP
Conditionally Independent Monitoring
Figure 18 and 19 illustrates the replicator dynamics of 2MP against GRIM and TFT with
CI monitoring. The probability of noise is set to  = (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3).
Firstly, we will consider  = 0.05, we can see seven equilibrium points, out of which four are
unstable equilibria and three are stable equilibria existing at each vertex of the ternary graph.
Out of the four unstable equilibria three are on axes of the ternary graph and therefore exists
for two strategies only. They are (0.787, 0.213, 0) for GRIM vs TFT, (0.133, 0, 0.867)
for GRIM vs 2MP and (0, 0.752, 0.248) for TFT vs 2MP. the remaining unstable equilib-
rium point consists of all three FSA‘s and can be seen at (0.290, 0.411, 0.299).
Secondly, we will consider  = 0.1, here we can see six equilibrium points, three of which
are unstable equilibria and three being the vertices are stable equilibria consisting of a single
strategy in a homogeneous state. Two of the above said unstable equilibria denoted by the
red dots are on the axes of the graph pertaining to GRIM vs TFT at (0.635, 0.365, 0) and
TFT vs 2MP at (0, 0.750, 0.250). And the third unstable equilibrium consists of all three
FSA‘s and exists at (0.162, 0.547, 0.291).
When comparing  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 under CI monitoring the first difference we notice is
that 2MP is exploited by GRIM much more than ALLD15. TFT vs 2MP on the other hand re-
mains almost unchanged at (0, 0.750, 0.250). For GRIM vs TFT, TFT weakens16 a bit and
the new unstable equilibrium point is at (0.635, 0.365, 0) compared to (0.787, 0.213, 0)
for  = 0.05.
Thirdly, we will consider  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 (Figure 7), here, GRIM successfully exploits
TFT17 and dominates 2MP. When  = 0.2, TFT is barely able to survive18 against 2MP, and
15The unstable equilibrium point for ALLD vs 2MP is (0.195, 0, 0.805) amd for GRIM vs 2MP it is
(0.133, 0, 0.867). Larger the population, weaker the strategy.
16Stronger against GRIM than ALLD.
17When  = 0.2 GRIM is able to exploit TFT only when the population of TFT is < 0.845.
18When  = 0.2 2MP is able to exploit TFT only when the population of TFT is < 0.901.
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when noise is increased to  = 0.3, TFT is wholly dominated by 2MP and GRIM. Further-
more, 2MP is dominated by GRIM. Therefore, we can safely conclude that for 2MP against
GRIM and TFT when the noise increases under conditionally independent monitoring, GRIM
becomes the best choice for players.
By observing Figure 6 and Figure 7 we can conclude that each strategy is dominated by
another when the probability of noise is small. i.e when  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 TFT>GRIM,
GRIM>2MP and 2MP>TFT. Therefore for at each instance of noise under  = 0.2 we are
able to observe an unstable equilibrium.
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Figure 18: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against GRIM and TFT with conditionally independent mon-
itoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 respectively. Almost identical to the replicator
dynamics of 2MP against ALLD and TFT.
Table 28: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
GRIM TFT 2MP
GRIM 0.556 0.638 0.802
TFT 0.522 0.763 0.663
2MP 0.434 0.711 0.821
Table 29: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.1
GRIM TFT 2MP
GRIM 0.402 0.560 0.726
TFT 0.334 0.679 0.540
2MP 0.240 0.631 0.683
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Figure 19: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against GRIM and TFTT with conditionally independent
monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 respectively. Both TFT and 2MP are exploited
GRIM.
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Table 30: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.2
GRIM TFT 2MP
GRIM 0.277 0.583 0.648
TFT 0.137 0.609 0.402
2MP 0.092 0.597 0.505
Table 31: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.3
GRIM TFT 2MP
GRIM 0.225 0.675 0.598
TFTT 0.010 0.578 0.299
2MP 0.039 0.626 0.417
5 2MP against ALLC and TFT and the variants
In this section we will analyse the replicator dynamics of ALLC vs TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT vs
2MP with CI monitoring. We will not consider perfect monitoring since all of these cooperate
on their first move and will not defect. Our objective is to analyse the replicator dynam-
ics of 2MP with an unconditionally cooperating strategy (ALLC) and several conditionally
cooperating strategies (TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT, Figure 1, 2 ). GTFT compared to TFT is a
slightly more forgiving strategy. GTFT cooperates with a probability of 0.333 even when the
opponent player defects (Figure 2). TFTT (Tit For two Tats) as the name itself suggests, is a
far less forgiving strategy than TFT. TFTT, after being defected by the other player will not
cooperate again unless the other player cooperates twice in a row (Figure 2).
The replicator dynamics are illustrated using a ternary graph. Each vertex of the graph
is a represents a strategy in a homogeneous state and has a population of 1. Furthermore,
every point in the ternary graph defines a population. For ALLC vs TFT vs 2MP it is
denoted by (xALLC , yTFT , z2MP ). e.g. (1, 0, 0) is the vertex of the ternary graph where the
population consists only of ALLD. Whereas (xALLC = 1), (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) denotes a point
where each strategy is in same frequencies. And each axis of the ternary graph represents the
replicator dynamics of two strategies. i.e. ALLC vs TFT, ALLC vs 2MP, TFT vs 2MP. A
green dot represents a stable equilibrium point while a red dot denotes an unstable equilibrium.
When every possible frequency of two strategies are in stable equilibria it is shown by a green
(Neutrality see section 2.3). Here, a stable equilibrium is a point at which small perturbations
from the population will still result in the population converging on the stable equilibrium
point. Accordingly, an unstable equilibrium is a point at which a small perturbation from the
population will result in a deviation from the unstable equilibrium point. The blue arrows
represent vectors corresponding to the rate of population change. The direction of the arrow
can simply be interpreted as the tendency of a given population to shift towards a certain
frequency (an arrow pointing in the direction of a certain strategy (vertex) implies that the
frequency of that strategy is on the increase).
Instead of two specific players repeating a game infinitely, we consider a population of
players, each with their own strategy. Each period, two players meet at random and play
the game, using their respective strategies. After which the players are given their respective
payoffs according to their strategies. And the population will evolve their strategies depending
on these payoffs i.e. players will change their strategies into much more advantageous strategies
used by other players in the population. All of the players in the population are considered
to be identical, that is players differ only by the strategy they use.
Below are the replicator equations for ALLC vs TFT vs 2MP. x, y, z are the frequencies of
ALLC, TFT and 2MP respectively.Since the size of the population is set to 1, z = (1−x− y).
fALLC , fTFT , f2MP are the payoffs when using the strategies ALLC, TFT and 2MP respectively.
V ALLCvsTFT is the payoff of ALLD vs TFT and and so on. We can formulate the replicator
equations for GTFT and TFTT just by interchanging the values corresponding to TFT with
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GTFT or TFTT.
˙xALLC = x[y(f2MP − fTFT ) + (x− 1)(f2MP − fALLC)]
˙yTFT = y[(y − 1)(f2MP − fTFT ) + x(f2MP − fALLC)]
˙z2MP = z[y(f2MP − fTFT ) + x(f2MP − fALLC)]
The payoffs for ALLC, TFT and 2MP are as follows.
fALLC = xV
ALLCvsALLC + yV ALLCvsTFT + zV ALLCvs2−MP
fTFT = xV
TFTvsALLC + yV TFTvsTFT + zV TFTvs2−MP
f2MP = xV
2MPvsALLC + yV 2MPvsTFT + zV 2MPvs2−MP
5.1 Base Case
Figure 20 and 21 illustrates the replicator dynamics of ALLC vs TFT vs 2MP with CI mon-
itoring. The probability of noise is set to  = (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3). GTFT is a slightly more
forgiving strategy than TFT and TFTT is a far less forgiving strategy than TFT.
For  = 0.05, there are five equilibrium points, out of which one is an unstable equilibria
and four are stable equilibria existing at each vertex of the ternary graph and one on the
ALLC vs TFT axis. This is the first time we see a stable equilibrium between two strategies
in the presence of noise. The unstable equilibrium is on the axis of the ternary graph and
therefore exists for two strategies only. It is (0, 0.752, 0.248) for TFT vs 2MP. The stable
equilibrium exists at (0.765, 0.235, 0) for ALLC vs TFT and for ALLC vs 2MP, 2MP
dominates ALLC exploiting it‘s unconditional cooperativeness.
For  = 0.1, there are five equilibrium points, four of which are stable equilibria and out of
which one is between the ALLC vs TFT axis and three are on the vertices of the graph, and
in homogeneous states. The remaining equilibria are unstable, and these are denoted by the
red dots on the axis of the graph pertaining to TFT vs 2MP and an equilibrium consisting of
all three strategies. For ALLC vs TFT the stable equilibrium exists at (0.611, 0.399, 0)
and for TFT vs 2MP the unstable equilibrium exists at (0, 0.752, 0.248). The unstable
equilibrium containing all three FSA‘s and exists at (0.006, 0.758, 0.236).
When comparing  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 under CI monitoring we notice that there is
an unstable equilibrium consisting of all three strategies when noise increases from 0.05 to
0.1. The only other difference is the equilibrium point between ALLC and TFT shift from
(0.765, 0.235, 0) to (0.611, 0.399, 0) when the noise increases from 0.05 to 0.1. In both
instances ALLC is wholly dominated by 2MP.
For  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 (Figure 21), the population is shifting towards 2MP as 2MP is
able to succesfully exploit TFT and dominate ALLC. There is also an unstable equilibrium
containing all three FSA‘s and existing at (0.014, 0.939, 0.047) for  = 0.3. When  = 0.3,
both TFT and ALLC are wholly dominated by 2MP. Therefore, in these settings we can
conclude that for 2MP against ALLC and TFT, when the noise increases, 2MP becomes the
best choice for players.
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Figure 20: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLC and TFT with conditionally independent mon-
itoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 respectively. 2MP successfully exploits both ALLC
and TFT.
Table 32: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLC TFT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.910 0.387
TFT 1.045 0.763 0.663
2MP 1.306 0.711 0.821
Table 33: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.1
ALLC TFT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.820 0.088
TFT 1.090 0.679 0.540
2MP 1.456 0.631 0.683
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Figure 21: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLC and TFT with conditionally independent moni-
toring. The probability of noise is  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 respectively. Both TFT and ALLC are dominated by
2MP.
Table 34: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.2
ALLC TFT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.640 -0.171
TFT 1.180 0.609 0.402
2MP 1.585 0.597 0.505
Table 35: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.3
ALLC TFT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.460 -0.263
TFT 1.270 0.578 0.299
2MP 1.632 0.626 0.417
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5.2 GTFT/ TFTT
Figure 22 and 23 illustrates the replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLC and GTFT with
CI monitoring. The probability of noise is set to  = (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3).
Firstly, we will consider  = 0.05, there are four equilibrium points, all of which are
stable equilibria. Out of these, three exists at each vertex of the ternary graph. The re-
maining stable equilibrium is on the ALLC vs GTFT axis of the ternary graph and exists
at (0.707, 0.293, 0). For TFT vs 2MP and ALLC vs 2MP axes we can see that 2MP
dominates both ALLC and GTFT.
Secondly, we will consider  = 0.1, here, once again we can see four equilibrium points, three
of which are stable equilibria at the vertices of the graph and consisting of a single strategy
in a homogeneous state. The remaining equilibrium is on the axis of the graph pertaining to
ALLC vs GTFT. For ALLC vs GTFT the stable equilibrium exists at (0.488, 0.512, 0).
When comparing  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 under conditional independent monitoring we notice
that there is no significant change other than the equilibrium point between ALLC vs GTFT.
The equilibrium point has shifted from (0.707, 0.293, 0) to (0.488, 0.512, 0) when the
noise increased from 0.05 to 0.1. In both instances ALLC and GTFT is wholly dominated by
2MP.
Thirdly, we will consider  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 (Figure 23), here we clearly see the population
shifting towards 2MP as 2MP is able to succesfully exploit the forgiving nature of GTFT and
the unconditionally cooperating nature of ALLC. Therefore, in these settings we can conclude
that for 2MP against ALLC and GTFT, when the noise increases, 2MP becomes the best
choice for players.
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Figure 22: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLC and GTFT with conditionally independent
monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 respectively. 2MP successfully dominates both
ALLC and GTFT while ALLC and GTFT are in a stable equilibrium.
Table 36: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLC GTFT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.911 0.387
GTFT 1.044 0.804 0.654
2MP 1.306 1.429 0.821
Table 37: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.1
ALLC GTFT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.825 0.088
GTFT 1.087 0.742 0.491
2MP 1.456 1.485 0.683
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Figure 23: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLC and GTFT with conditionally independent
monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 respectively. Both TFT and ALLC are dominated
by 2MP.
Table 38: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.2
ALLC GTFT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.660 -0.171
GTFT 1.170 0.682 0.317
2MP 1.585 1.327 0.505
Table 39: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.3
ALLC GTFT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.505 -0.263
GTFT 1.248 0.649 0.211
2MP 1.632 1.176 0.417
Figure 24 and 25 illustrates the replicator dynamics of ALLC, TFTT and 2MP with con-
ditionally independent monitoring. The probability of noise is set to  = (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3).
For  = 0.05, we can see six equilibrium points, out of which two are unstable equilibria
and four are stable equilibria existing at each vertex of the ternary graph and between ALLC
vs TFTT. Out of the the two unstable equilibria, one is on the TFTT vs 2MP axis of the
ternary graph and the other consists of all three strategies. They are (0, 0.332, 0.668) for
TFTT vs 2MP and (0.140, 0.524, 0.336) for all three strategies. The stable equilibrium
between ALLC vs TFTT exists at (0.766, 0.234, 0). For ALLC vs 2MP, 2MP is able to
wholly dominate ALLC. As was seen in Figure 15 in ALLD vs TFTT vs 2MP, TFTT is much
more robust than 2MP.
 = 0.1, here too we can see six equilibrium points, four of which are stable equilibria exist-
ing at the vertices of the graph and between ALLC and TFTT existing at (0.615, 0.385, 0).
Out of the remaining equilibria all are unstable equilibria, one is on the axis of the graph
pertaining to TFTT vs 2MP. And the other an equilibrium consisting of all three strate-
gies. The unstable equilibrium exists at (0, 0.109, 0.891) for TFTT vs 2MP and at
(0.165, 0.610, 0.225) for all three strategies.
When comparing  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 under CI monitoring we notice that the population
shift towards 2MP decreases and increases towards TFTT. We can see that with the intro-
duction of TFTT, a far less forgiving strategy than both TFT and GTFT, 2MP is weakened
considerably.
For  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 (Figure 25), the major difference we can see is that TFTT
is able to dominate 2MP rather than the other way around (both TFT and GTFT were
dominated by 2MP). There is also a stable equilibrium between ALLC and TFTT existing
at (0.161, 0.839, 0). As the noise increases under conditionally independent monitoring,
34
TFTT becomes the best choice for players. When  = 0.3 both ALLC and 2MP are completely
dominated by TFTT unless the population is a homogeneous state of ALLC or 2MP. Even
introducing a tiny fraction of TFTT at  = 0.3 will result in the whole population shifting
towards TFTT.
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Figure 24: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLC and TFTT with conditionally independent
monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.05 and  = 0.1 respectively. TFTT successfully exploits both
ALLC and 2MP while ALLC is wholly dominated by 2MP.
Table 40: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLC TFTT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.833 0.387
TFTT 1.083 0.560 0.777
2MP 1.306 0.472 0.821
Table 41: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.1
ALLC TFTT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.674 0.088
TFTT 1.163 0.414 0.672
2MP 1.456 0.330 0.683
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Figure 25: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLC and TFTT with conditionally independent
monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.2 and  = 0.3 respectively. Both 2MP and ALLC are dominated
by TFTT.
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Table 42: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.2
ALLC TFTT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.381 -0.171
TFTT 1.310 0.321 0.557
2MP 1.585 0.261 0.505
Table 43: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.3
ALLC TFTT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.120 -0.263
TFTT 1.440 0.312 0.481
2MP 1.632 0.263 0.417
Comparison of ALLC vs TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT vs 2MP with CI monitoring
Here, we will analyse the replicator dynamics of ALLC vs TFT vs 2MP, ALLC vs GTFT
vs 2MP and ALLC vs TFTT vs 2MP with CI monitoring. The probability of noise is set to
 = 0.05. GTFT compared to TFT is a slightly more forgiving strategy. We say GTFT is
slightly more forgiving because GTFT cooperates with a probability of 0.333 even when the
opponent player defects (Figure 2). TFTT (Tit For two Tats) as the name itself suggests, is a
far less forgiving strategy than TFT. TFTT, after being defected by the other player will not
cooperate again unless the other player cooperates twice in a row (Figure 2).
ALLC vs TFT vs 2MP and ALLD vs GTFT vs 2MP have similar replicator dynamics with
the one exception of TFT vs 2MP. TFT is in an unstable equilibrium with 2MP whereas GTFT
is completely dominated by 2MP. GTFT because of its forgiving nature is completely taken
advantage of by 2MP. Interestingly we can see a stable equilibrium between ALLC vs TFT,
ALLC vs GTFT and ALLC vs TFTT, the reason for this is the unconditionally cooperating
nature of ALLC. For ALLC vs TFTT vs 2MP, TFTT is able to hold off 2MP (unlike TFT
and GTFT) even with increasing noise.
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Table 44: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLC TFT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.910 0.387
TFT 1.045 0.763 0.663
2MP 1.306 0.711 0.821
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Figure 26: The replicator dynamics of 2MP against ALLC and TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT with conditionally
independent monitoring. The probability of noise is  = 0.05. While TFT and GTFT are both exploited by
2MP, TFTT alone is able to stand against 2MP. Out of TFT, GTFT and TFTT the weakest strategy in these
settings is GTFT.
Table 45: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLC GTFT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.911 0.387
GTFT 1.044 0.804 0.654
2MP 1.306 1.429 0.821
Table 46: Payoffs for CI monitoring  = 0.05
ALLC TFTT 2MP
ALLC 1 0.833 0.387
TFTT 1.083 0.560 0.777
2MP 1.306 0.472 0.821
6 Four Strategies: ALLC vs ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP
In this section our objective is to analyse the replicator dynamics of 2MP with three more
strategies. i.e. Instead of the three strategy replicator dynamics as described in the previous
sections, we will investigate the replicator dynamics when there are four strategies present
in the population. We have only considered CI monitoring with  = 0.05 and not perfect
monitoring, because in the presence of ALLC, ALLD will be the viable strategy.
As described in section 2.4, instead of two specific players repeating a game infinitely, we
consider a population of players, each with their own strategy. Each period, two players meet
at random and play the game, using their strategies. After which the players are given their
respective payoffs according to the strategies. We also assume that the population can evolve
depending on their payoffs. All individuals in the population are considered to be identical,
players differ only by their strategy. We assume that the size of the population is 1.
We will plot the population change with respect to a given period of time. Firstly, we
will plot the population change when the initial population is in equal proportions of each
strategy (xALLC = xALLD = xTFT = x2MP = 0.25). See Figure 27. Secondly, we will plot the
population change when the initial population has a majority of ALLD population, a minority
of 2MP and the same amount of ALLC and TFT (xALLC =
(1−p−q)
2
, xALLD = p, xTFT =
(1−p−q)
2
, x2MP = q). See Figure 28. Thirdly, we will plot the population change when the
initial population has a majority of TFT population, a minority of 2MP population and the
same amount of ALLC and ALLD (xALLC =
(1−p−q)
2
, xALLD =
(1−p−q)
2
, xTFT = p, x2MP = q).
See Figure 29.
Although, a majority of ALLD exceeding 0.525 will result in the population shifting
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towards ALLD, any amount less than 0.525 will result in the population shifting towards
2MP. Furthermore, a majority of ALLC population is not plotted since an excess of ALLC
will only make ALLD stronger19 and the population will shift towards ALLD.
Below are the replicator equations for ALLC vs ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP. w, x, y, z are the
frequencies of ALLC, ALLD, TFT and 2MP respectively.Since the size of the population is set
to 1, z = (1−w− x− y). fALLC , fALLD, fTFT , f2MP are the payoffs when using the strategies
ALLC, ALLD, TFT and 2MP respectively. V ALLDvsTFT is the payoff of ALLD vs TFT and
and so on.
˙wALLC = w[x(f2MP − fALLD) + y(f2MP − fTFT ) + (w − 1)(f2MP − fALLC)]
˙xALLD = x[(x− 1)(f2MP − fALLD) + y(f2MP − fTFT ) + w(f2MP − fALLC)]
˙yTFT = y[x(f2MP − fALLD) + (y − 1)(f2MP − fTFT ) + w(f2MP − fALLC)]
˙z2MP = z[x(f2MP − fALLD) + y(f2MP − fTFT ) + w(f2MP − fALLC)]
The payoffs for ALLD, TFT and 2MP are as follows.
fALLC = wV
ALLCvsALLC + xV ALLCvsALLD + yV ALLCvsTFT + zV ALLCvs2−MP
fALLD = wV
ALLDvsALLC + xV ALLDvsALLD + yV ALLDvsTFT + zV ALLDvs2−MP
fTFT = wV
TFTvsALLC + xV TFTvsALLD + yV TFTvsTFT + zV TFTvs2−MP
f2MP = wV
2MPvsALLC + xV 2MPvsALLD + yV 2MPvsTFT + zV 2MPvs2−MP
The equilibrium points for four strategies is as follows. All of these equilibrium points, except
for the equilibrium point between ALLC vs ALLD vs TFT, are the same as the equilibrium
points for three strategies with CI monitoring.
(xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ) ≡ (1, 0, 0, 0)→ Fixed point of ALLC
(xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ) ≡ (0, 1, 0, 0)→ Fixed point of ALLD
(xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ) ≡ (0, 0, 1, 0)→ Fixed point of TFT
(xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ) ≡ (0, 0, 0, 1)→ Fixed point of 2MP
(xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ) ≡ (0, 0.765, 0.235, 0)→ ALLD vs TFT
(xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ) ≡ (0, 0.195, 0, 0.805)→ ALLD vs 2MP
(xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ) ≡ (0, 0.321, 0.173, 0.506)→ ALLD vs TFT vs 2MP
(xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ) ≡ (0, 0, 0.752, 0.248)→ TFT vs 2MP
(xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ) ≡ (0.765, 0, 0.235, 0)→ ALLC vs TFT
(xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP ) ≡ (0.292, 0.091, 0.617, 0)→ ALLC vs ALLD vs TFT
Initial population with equal frequencies
We plotted the frequency change of 4 different strategies with respect to time when the
initial population were in equal proportions (xALLC = xALLD = xTFT = x2MP = 0.25). The
probability of noise is set to  = 0.05 under CI monitoring. Our object was to analyse the
replicator dynamics of a population using four different strategies (ALLC, ALLD, TFT, 2MP)
with the initial populations in equal proportions.
After investigating Figure 27, we can initially see that the population ALLC is in a rapid
decline while the population of ALLD is on a rapid increase. With the increment of ALLD,
19See the population change of xALLC in Figures 27, 28 and 29.
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TFT also increases. But when TFT is over 0.23520 ALLD gradually starts to decline. When
the population of ALLD and TFT are approximately 0.336 and 0.422, 2MP starts to increase.
TFT will still gradually increase up to 0.696 and decline from there onwards. Finally, 2MP
is the only strategy left and all of the other strategies are almost at 0 and/or declining.
Initial population with a larger frequency of ALLD
In this section, we plotted the population change with respect to time when the initial pop-
ulation had a larger frequency of ALLD (xALLC =
(1−p−q)
2
, xALLD = p, xTFT =
(1−p−q)
2
, x2MP =
q). The probability of noise is set to  = 0.05 under CI monitoring. In Figure 28, when p = 0.5
and q = 0.02 2MP is still able to be the dominating strategy albeit it takes more repetitions
to do so.
Once again the population of ALLC is once again on a rapid decline while the population
of ALLD shows the same behaviour as before. TFT, manages to dominate all three strategies
for a brief while but ALLC gradually increases when TFT is almost at 1. With the increment
of ALLC, TFT gradually declines and when TFT has declined to 0.75221, 2MP will start to
increase and will eventually dominate all other strategies.
Initial population with a larger frequency of TFT
In this section, we plotted the population change with respect to time when the initial pop-
ulation had a larger frequency of ALLD (xALLC =
(1−p−q)
2
, xALLD =
(1−p−q)
2
, xTFT = p, x2MP =
q). The probability of noise is set to  = 0.05 under CI monitoring. In Figure 29, when p = 0.5
and q = 0.02 2MP is still able to be the dominating strategy and does it in lesser repetitions
compared to when there was a larger frequency of ALLD. Interestingly we can see a pattern
in the increment and decrement of the populations.
ALLC is able to survive for a longer period of time due to the excess of TFT. Both
ALLD and ALLC seem to fluctuate depending on the population of TFT. However, ALLD is
diminished fairly quickly when there is a majority of TFT. 2MP once again manages to out
survive all three strategies.
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Figure 27: Initial population (xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP )≡(0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25)
20This is the bistable point between ALLD and TFT
21This is the bistabel point between TFT and 2MP
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Figure 28: Initial population (xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP )≡(0.24, 0.50, 0.24, 0.02)
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Figure 29: Initial population (xALLC , xALLD, xTFT , x2MP )≡(0.24, 0.24, 0.50, 0.02)
7 Conclusions
This paper analysed the replicator dynamics of 2MP in repeated Prisoner‘s Dilemma with noisy
observations. We investigated with three main observation methods, perfect monitoring, NP
monitoring and CI monitoring. However, since NP monitoring and CI monitoring resulted
in similar22 replicator dynamics. We focused our attention on perfect monitoring and CI
monitoring only. For CI monitoring the noise levels are set to  = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3. Perfect
monitoring, is observation without noise (the probability of noise is zero).
2MP with perfect monitoring, against unconditionally defecting strategies (ALLD) and
conditionally cooperating strategies (TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT), did well against the latter strate-
gies only. 2MP with TFT, GTFT and TFTT were mutually in neutrality. Where, neither
could benifit from deviating from their respective strategies. Furthermore, with perfect mon-
itoring 2MP did far worse23 against ALLD, than TFT. With perfect monitoring TFT, GTFT
and TFTT all had higher payoffs than 2MP and were the better strategies.
2MP with CI monitoring, against defecting strategies (ALLD, GRIM) and conditionally
22See section 3.1.
23The equilibrium points for ALLD vs TFT and ALLD vs 2MP are (0.889, 0.111, 0) and (0.415, 0, 0.585)
respectively.
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cooperating strategies (TFT/ GTFT/ TFTT), was exploited by ALLD or GRIM, as noise
levels increased, ALLD or GRIM wholly dominated 2MP and other strategies. However, if
ALLD is replaced with ALLC, 2MP immediately becomes the dominant strategy, and suc-
cessfully exploits ALLC, GTFT and TFT. 2MP could not exploit TFTT even with ALLC in
the population.
With four strategies and CI monitoring, 2MP becomes the dominant strategy even when
there were majorities of ALLD or TFT. In the case of four strategies, the presence of both
ALLC and TFT had lowered the threshold for success of 2MP [2]. But, the survivability
of 2MP seems to depend on the proportions of the other strategies. This is a point worth
researching further.
Conclusively, 2MP with CI monitoring only managed to do well in the presence of forgiving
strategies such as, GTFT and ALLC. Even then, the presence of an unconditional defector
like ALLD or GRIM in the mix hugely undermined 2MP. 2MP could not coexist with these
forgiving strategies, it only tried to dominate them. Less forgiving strategies like GRIM,
TFTT and ALLD all managed to successfully exploit 2MP under CI monitoring for all levels
of noise.
Future developments for this research would be, to increase the number of strategies in the
population and use several monitoring methods to see the using other monitoring methods
such as trembling hand to determine the superiority of 2MP. Understanding the relationship
between survivability of 2MP and the proportions of the other strategies such as ALLC, ALLD
and TFT is a crucial step towards unraveling this unique strategy.
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